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Hand in glove with the internationalization of portfolios and the interlinking
of money markets across currencies has been the expanded use of methods to
hedge currency risk. The rapid proliferation of hedging techniques and the
reduction in communication and transactions costs have proceeded simultane-
ously with these trends. While basic hedging instruments such as forward ex-
change contracts have a long history, the use of newer instruments such as
exchange-traded options and futures contracts and over-the-counter (OTC) op-
tions and currency swaps has grown dramatically in the past decade. In addi-
tion, option-pricing methods have been used in dynamic hedging strategies to
construct tailor-made synthetic derivative products—a transplantation to cur-
rency markets of the portfolio insurance methods used to hedge equity mar-
ket exposure.
The crash of 1987 led to justifiable skepticism about the ability of mechanis-
tic trading strategies like dynamic hedging actually to deliver the intended
hedge protection when markets are illiquid.
1 In addition, these strategies have
been criticized for their tendency to exacerbate price trends. Such criticisms
carry over to the use of dynamic hedging in currency markets, although cur-
rency markets are usually among the most liquid of financial markets.
In this paper, we examine the effect of dynamic hedging strategies on for-
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1. See, e.g., the Brady Commission (1988) and SEC (1988) reports. Grossman (1988) forecast
this problem. Gennotte and Leland (1990) model the relation between hedging operations and
market liquidity and show how a relatively small volume of transactions initiated by hedgers can
lead to a large price change.
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eign exchange markets during those crisis periods when even the exchange
markets can become illiquid. Although we place some emphasis on the well-
known inability of these strategies to perform well for the hedger when a dis-
continuity in the exchange rate or an upsurge of volatility occurs, we are con-
cerned primarily with the effect of hedging strategies on the efficacy of the
classic central bank interest rate defense of a fixed exchange rate. It is typically
believed that a central bank can defend an exchange rate if it is willing to raise
short-term interest rates sufficiently high to squeeze holders of short positions
in its currency. In the presence of dynamic hedging, however, mechanistic sell-
ing of the domestic currency may arise in the end game of the interest rate
defense, and this may overwhelm the credit lines available to the central bank
for intervention in the exchange market before those squeezed by the interest
rate increase start to buy. Thus, our ultimate focus is on market and central
bank behavior in the crucial last moments of a fixed exchange rate, the bound-
ary point toward which the collapsing system converges.
The essay is organized as follows. In section 6.1, we outline the growth of
the derivative markets in currency products and analyze the instruments avail-
able for balancing a currency position. We then describe the role of dynamic
hedging in the currency markets. In section 6.2, we consider the hedging oper-
ations of nonbanks and the techniques in general use. We then analyze sche-
matically the methods used by banks to hedge the currency exposures in their
foreign exchange books. In section 6.3, we examine the mechanics of central
bank currency intervention and the effect of interest rate defenses on market
liquidity, particularly on the response of dynamic hedging programs to interest
rate increases. We also consider how the interaction between the timing of
different trading programs—dynamic hedging versus closing positions to
avoid a squeeze—and the credit lines of the central bank may force the central
bank to abandon a fixed exchange rate if it is driven either to the limit of its
credit line or to its self-imposed position limit before buyers of the currency
arrive.
6.1 The Role of Dynamic Hedging in Foreign Exchange Markets
6.1.1 Markets for Foreign Exchange Products
The use of financial derivatives has grown rapidly in recent years. The no-
tional value of outstanding exchange-traded and over-the-counter (OTC) fi-
nancial derivative contracts—including futures, forwards, forward rate
agreements, swaps, options, caps, floors, and collars—has grown from approx-
imately $7.2 trillion at the end of 1989 to $17.6 trillion at the end of 1992.
2
2. These estimates are derived in General Accounting Office (1994). The notional value of a
contract is the nominal amount used as a base to calculate a transfer of payments according to a
contractual formula. For example, a simple interest rate swap may have a notional principal of $ 10211 Dynamic Hedging
By expanding the opportunities for borrowers and lenders to change the risk
characteristics—such as maturity or currency denomination—of their portfo-
lios, the growth in derivatives markets has dramatically altered the nature of
international finance and the behavior of market participants.
The 1992 notional amounts are composed of $4.8 trillion in exchange-traded
contracts, $4.7 trillion in swaps, and $8.1 trillion in OTC options and forward
contracts. Foreign exchange derivatives are important components of these
markets, particularly the OTC markets. While the notional principal of out-
standing exchange-traded foreign exchange derivatives at the end of 1992 was
only $105 billion, there were $860 billion in currency swaps and $5.5 trillion
in foreign exchange forwards and OTC options outstanding. In contrast, the
notional principal of outstanding interest rate products was $4.4 trillion in
exchange-traded contracts, $3.9 trillion in swaps, $634 billion in OTC options,
and $2 trillion in forward rate agreements. Stock index derivatives totaled
$245 billion.
The OTC markets in derivative products are concentrated in the hands of a
small number of large banks and securities firms in the major financial centers.
For example, bank holding companies with more than $10 billion in assets
hold between 98 and 100 percent of all OTC derivative positions taken by U.S.
banks.
3 OTC contracts are often designed specifically for the needs of particu-
lar end users and therefore have tailor-made features such as maturity, currency
denomination, and notional principal and are frequently combined with other
derivatives and sold as a package. Many OTC trades are interdealer trades in
which dealers seek to balance their positions.
Exchange-traded derivative products—futures and options—are standard-
ized, retail-sized products. Although they are retail in nature, they are generally
used by the dealers in OTC markets to balance positions when credit lines with
other financial institutions are filled or when wholesale counterparties are hard
to find. Because the exchange's clearinghouse is the counterparty to each con-
tract, and because positions are usually well collateralized through margin re-
quirements, evaluation of creditworthiness is less of an issue on organized ex-
changes than in the OTC market.
4 The most actively traded financial
derivatives on organized exchanges are futures on interest rates, primarily U.S.
million. This notional value is not delivered as principal. Rather, the counterparties would deliver
or receive the net between the fixed interest rate applied to $10 million and the floating rate
amount, so the claims that the counterparties might have on each other are far smaller than the
notional value.
3. Estimates reported in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1993). For discus-
sions of the activities of banks in OTC derivatives markets, see also Bank of England (1993), Bank
for International Settlements (1992), Deutsche Bundesbank (1993), Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (1993), General Accounting Office (1994), Group of Thirty (1993), and Goldstein
and Folkerts-Landau (1993).
4. OTC derivatives dominate exchange-traded products with limited liquidity such as longer-
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Treasury bond rates, Eurodollars, French government bonds (OAT), German
Bunds, and Japanese government bonds.
The expansion in derivatives markets is reflected in the turnover statistics
that have also increased substantially in recent years. Annual turnover of
exchange-traded derivatives increased from an estimated 420 million contracts
in 1989 to 774 million in 1993.
5 The estimated global net foreign exchange
market turnover, comprising transactions in spot and forward foreign exchange
and currency swaps and OTC options, was $880 billion per day in April 1992,
compared with $620 billion in April 1989 (Bank for International Settlements
1993). Spot trades accounted for 47 percent of reported turnover, while foreign
exchange swaps resulted in 39 percent of turnover. Trading in currency futures
averaged $9.5 billion per day, and trading in currency options averaged approx-
imately $28 billion, about 82 percent of which was OTC.
6.1.2 Hedging Foreign Exchange Exposure
Open positions denominated in foreign currencies expose market partici-
pants to losses from exchange rate changes. Accounting for such risk is vital
for portfolio managers with foreign currency exposure, corporates with
foreign-currency-denominated assets or liabilities such as receivables or pay-
ables, or banks with currency exposure. Institutional investors play an im-
portant role in such investment. At the end of 1991, institutional investors—
mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies—in OECD countries
had total assets of approximately $11.7 trillion, compared to the assets of com-
mercial banks, which totaled $19.6 trillion. The sizes of their exposures in
absolute terms and even in relation to their total assets can be quite large.
6 For
example, U.S. mutual funds and pension funds held $214 billion in foreign
assets or 5 percent of their combined end-1991 assets of $4.1 trillion. In con-
trast, U.K. mutual funds and pension funds invested $151 billion abroad—23
percent of their total assets. Institutional investors in Germany, Japan, and the
Netherlands also invest sizable proportions of their assets abroad. More sig-
nificant, perhaps, there are few restrictions on the foreign investments of insti-
tutional investors in industrial countries, and the trend appears to be toward
relaxing those constraints that do exist. Banks, in contrast, often have well-
defined position limits—either statutory or self-imposed—on their foreign ex-
change exposures.
The risks from such holdings are hedged or reduced by taking an offsetting
position in the foreign currency—for example, a long position is hedged by
shorting the currency in some fashion. This may consist of a spot sale with
borrowing in the currency to cover settlement, a forward or future sale, or the
5. See Goldstein and Folkerts-Landau (1994). Intertemporal comparisons of trading volume are
only suggestive; no adjustment is made for changes in the composition of trading activity across
contracts of different sizes.
6. For a discussion of the foreign holdings of institutional investors in industrial countries, see
Goldstein etal. (1993).213 Dynamic Hedging
acquisition of a put option or sale of a call option on the currency. Access to
these instruments differs across types of hedgers: exchange-traded futures or
options are retail products with little credit risk but with relatively high margin
requirements; OTC products provided by banks and nonbank dealers are typi-
cally offered in much larger notional values and require a credit line from the
bank to the customer along with a bank's assessment of its exposure to a given
client. Options generally provide a partial hedge. For example, a portfolio
manager may seek to ensure a floor to the domestic currency value of the for-
eign currency component of its portfolio, but the portfolio remains subject to
the risk of currency fluctuations while the portfolio value is above the floor.
7
Individual firms and portfolio managers ultimately must turn to banks to
engage in foreign exchange hedging since banks are the principal dealers in
the foreign exchange spot and derivatives markets. By taking the opposite side
of a transaction undertaken by a customer, a bank will acquire foreign ex-
change exposure that it will then attempt to eliminate. For those exposures that
do not net out in the course of a day's trading with other customers—for ex-
ample, currency or value-date mismatches in forward contract long and short
positions or different features of options contracts—the bank must actively
seek coverage by initiating its own transactions in the same OTC and
exchange-traded derivatives markets.
6.1.3 Mechanics of Option Pricing and Dynamic Hedging
Because option-pricing theory is at the heart of dynamic hedging, it is help-
ful at this point to review the basic option-pricing formula for foreign ex-
change—the Garman/Kohlhagen formula.
8 Although banks and other whole-
sale traders may use more sophisticated pricing methods that account for
varying interest rates and exchange rate volatility, the Garman/Kohlhagen for-
mula is in general operational use by pension fund and other portfolio manag-
ers, and it is pedagogically useful for illustrating the management of risk in a
bank's foreign exchange book.
9
7. In addition, portfolios will be subject to basis risk when the security underlying the hedge
instrument is not identical to the security whose return is being hedged so that the returns on the
two securities are not perfectly correlated. A hedge constructed with a related, but not identical,
instrument to the one whose value is being hedged is called a cross-hedge.
8. For the development of this formula, see Garman and Kohlhagen (1983) or Grabbe (1983).
For pricing formulas taking account of stochastic volatility, see Chiang and Okunev (1993), Kroner
and Sultan (1993), Melino and Turnbull (1990), Naik (1993), and Perraudin and Sorenson (1992).
Dumas, Jennergren, and Naslund (1993) derive option-pricing formulas for currencies restricted
by target zones as in the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). However, the majority of
options contracts are written for dollar transactions. In April 1992, 82 percent of net foreign ex-
change turnover involved the dollar on one side of the transaction; only 7 percent of total net
turnover involved exchanges of one ERM currency for another (Bank for International Settlements
1993). In the OTC options market, 74 percent of transactions involved the dollar.
9. Most exchange-traded currency options, other than those traded on the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange, are options on futures, for which the Garman/Kohlhagen formula for spot exchange
options is inapplicable. However, since the OTC segment of the options market accounts for more
than 85 percent of activity (see Bank for International Settlements 1993), the formula for options214 Peter M. Garber and Michael G. Spencer
Suppose that a customer buys a European put option to deliver deutsche
mark for dollars after T periods for an exercise price of $Z per deutsche mark.
The value of the put option, Pt, is
(1) Pt = -[1 - AW]exp[-rDMr]S + [1 - N(d2)]exp[-r$T]X,
where rDM and rs are the (constant) risk-free instantaneous deutsche mark and
dollar interest rates, S is the current dollar/deutsche mark spot exchange rate,
and X is the exercise or strike exchange rate of the option.
1
0 iV(d,) is the value
of the normal distribution function evaluated at the argument
dx = [ln(S/X) + (r$ - rDM + cr
2/2)T]h-^f,
where a is the (constant) instantaneous standard deviation or volatility of the
exchange rate S. Finally, d2 = d{ — cr\[T.
The put pricing formula is determined by finding the short position in
deutsche mark loans and the long position in dollar loans such that a portfolio
with these positions and also short a put is riskless with respect to small ex-
change rate movements.
Thus, an investor that wants to hedge its exposure to fluctuations in the dol-
lar/deutsche mark exchange rate can either hedge a long deutsche mark posi-
tion by buying a put option or use equation (1) to determine positions in
deutsche mark and dollar loans that mimic the value of a put—that is, to create
a synthetic put. The basic security in the first half of the formula is a loan
promising to deliver one deutsche mark in T periods—this has a deutsche mark
present value of exp[—rDMT] and a dollar value of exp[—rDMT]S. The coeffi-
cient — [1 — Nidy)] indicates that the mimicking portfolio should consist of a
short position of a fraction of such a deutsche mark loan—that is, a short
deutsche mark position. Similarly, the dollar position is long a fraction [1 -
N(d2)] of a loan promising to pay X dollars in T periods with a present dollar
value of exp[—rsT\X. However, since dx and d2 constantly move with the ex-
change rate, the interest rate differential, and the standard deviation projected
for exchange rate movements, the positions must be adjusted constantly—
hence the term dynamic hedging—to maintain the equivalence of the position
to a put option.
on spot exchange rates is more relevant to our discussion. In any event, since currency futures
contracts are very sensitive to changes in the interest rate differential, the delta of an option on a
currency future is more sensitive to interest rate changes than is the delta of an option on the spot
exchange rate, which would tend to strengthen our conclusion.
10. This equation is identical in form to the Merton adaptation of the Black-Scholes put formula
for a stock that pays a continuous, constant dividend. This formula is constructed on the assump-
tion that the percentage change in the price of the underlying security, in this case the dollar/
deutsche mark exchange rate, follows a Wiener process, that the instantaneous interest rates in
both countries and the standard deviation of the percentage exchange rate change are fixed parame-
ters for the life of the option. Such a simple formula does not exist for American put options; these
must be evaluated by numerical methods (see Hull 1993).215 Dynamic Hedging
The foreign exchange exposure of the agent that sells the put is to the possi-
bility of having to buy deutsche mark at the exercise price at date T. Under the
assumptions underlying the pricing formula, it is not necessary to hedge the
total face value of the contract prior to the exercise date. How much of the face
value to hedge, which in turn determines the hedge ratio, is provided by the
option's delta, the change in the value of the option with respect to a movement
in the exchange rate. From the pricing formula developed above, the delta of a
currency put option is —[1 — Af(d,)]exp(—rDMT). Thus, a rise in the dollar
value of the deutsche mark makes it less likely that the option will be exercised
and reduces the value of the put. The put delta takes values between — 1, for a
deep in-the-money option that would almost certainly be exercised, to 0, for a
deep out-of-the-money option that would never be exercised. The negative of
delta, therefore, provides a proxy for the probability of exercise. Delta
multiplied by the number of units of foreign currency provides an estimate of
the expected foreign exchange that is sold short at any point in time to hedge
against possible exercise of the option.
A writer of a put option may hedge the option dynamically according to
the prescriptions of the put pricing formula. First, it must establish the port-
folio that mimics the value of the option: for example, by shorting
[1 - N(d)l)]exp(—rDMT) deutsche mark spot for dollars and buying
[1 — N(d2)]exp[—rsT]X in U.S. Treasury bills. As the exchange rate fluctuates,
the now-hedged writer of the option must adjust the short deutsche mark and
long dollar positions according to the formula to continue to mimic the option.
Typically, the adjustments will not be continuous; instead, to avoid transactions
costs, adjustments to the mimicking portfolio will be made as part of a regular
rebalancing exercise.
Among other assumptions, the put pricing formula is based on assuming
that exchange rate volatility will remain constant during the life of the contract.
Because volatility typically is not constant, the mimicking portfolio will never
perfectly track the actual option's value—gains or losses relative to the initial
option premium will always occur—and so the portfolio must constantly be
adjusted to changes in volatilities as measured, frequently, by implied volatili-
ties in options prices. If volatility jumps above the value implicit in the price
of the actual put option, the writer of the put who also engages in dynamic
hedging will take a loss, and the buyer of the put will gain. It is well known
that strategies to create synthetic options to hedge actual options through the
use of dynamic trading, designed to be delta neutral, can be used to take posi-
tions on volatility in underlying prices and in interest rates (see, e.g., Cook-
son 1993).
The loss to the writer is immediately apparent if the portfolio is marked to
market. A volatility increase will, ceteris paribus, increase the value of the
actual option (a liability) and leave unchanged the value of the hedging portfo-
lio (the supposedly balancing asset). Alternatively, if the option value is not
marked to market, the loss will be booked through the dynamic adjustment of216 Peter M. Garber and Michael G. Spencer
deutsche mark and dollar positions until the exercise date. According to the
hedging strategy, a rise in the exchange rate will cause the writer of the put to
reduce the short deutsche mark position: the writer of the option will buy
deutsche mark when the deutsche mark appreciates and sell when it depreci-
ates. This "buy dear-sell cheap" strategy generates a foreseeable loss to the
writer of the put, for which it is compensated by the put premium. If volatility
jumps, however, the premium will be insufficient to cover the now greater-
than-expected realized loss on these hedging trades.
6.2 Dynamic Hedging by Type of Institution
6.2.1 Currency Risk Management by Fund Managers
Managers of pension funds, mutual funds, and bank trust accounts typically
manage their currency risk by dynamic hedging operations—including the use
of synthetic securities. For fixed-interest holdings of pension funds with obli-
gations denominated in a given currency, the hedge reflects the desire by fund
management to place a floor on the long-term value of foreign-currency-
denominated holdings. For funds investing in foreign equities, the long-term
reasons for establishing currency hedges is not as obvious because of the long-
run tendency for exchange rates to conform with purchasing power parity. Nev-
ertheless, in the short term—on a quarterly or an annual basis—fund manag-
ers' performance, and therefore their compensation, is often compared to a
benchmark. Moreover, fund managers seek to protect short-term performance
from significant declines to prevent an increase in redemptions. Similarly, for
pension funds, underfunding of liabilities may force an injection of securities
into the fund that tests the liquidity of the parent entity. For these reasons, fund
managers are sensitive in the short term to exchange rate movements and will
wish to hedge positions.
A hedge can be established by simply shorting the currency through a for-
ward or future sale in a static hedge, by replicating a put option synthetically,
by using constant-proportion portfolio insurance, or by acquiring an actual put
option, thereby shifting the dynamic hedging operation to the seller of the put.
In the simplest hedging operation, fund directors may establish currency risk
targets or limits to which management must adhere by following agreed hedg-
ing strategies. To place an absolute ceiling on losses from currency fluctua-
tions, fund directors may mandate the acquisition of a put option to cover the
entire foreign exchange position of the fund.
If they are willing to bear more risk from volatility changes, fund directors
may instruct management to replicate a put dynamically.
1
1 This method has
11. Using real put contracts to hedge long positions is not entirely free of volatility risk, of
course, since changes in volatility can result in losses when put contracts are rolled over if the
maturity of the contracts is shorter than the horizon of the hedging operation.217 Dynamic Hedging
become typical for fund management. As indicated above, this buy-high, sell-
low strategy ex post will have been less costly than an actual put if volatility
declines and more costly if volatility increases. Finally, many portfolio manag-
ers follow a constant-percentage portfolio insurance strategy: this is a buy-
high, sell-low dynamic strategy that does not replicate a put option.
1
2 Rather,
it is driven entirely by price movements. For example, one realization of this
strategy may aim at outperforming a 50 percent hedged position and would
begin with a 50 percent hedge. A 1 percent move in the exchange rate would
trigger an x percent change in the hedge ratio. If the foreign currency appreci-
ated by 10 percent, the hedge ratio would fall to 50 — \0x percent. Currency
depreciations would be met with opposite adjustments in the hedge ratio. The
strategy tends to work well when exchange rate changes come in trends but
fails with a mere jump in volatility.
1
3
Dynamic strategies are often implemented through cross-hedges—that is, a
hedge may be implemented through shorting a currency whose exchange rate
is highly correlated with the currency in which the fund holds securities. The
purpose is to take advantage of greater liquidity in the exchange market or an
interest rate premium in the currency used for the cross-hedge.
6.2.2 Risk Management of Bank Foreign Exchange Books
Because of internal risk-control operations and regulation of foreign ex-
change risk, banks are active in using dynamic hedging techniques. Typically,
they will hedge the net exposure to exchange rate changes acquired through
transactions with clients, but they may leverage exchange risk when trading for
proprietary accounts.
Regulation on banks' net foreign exchange positions varies widely across
industrial countries.
1
4 In some countries, such as the United States, banks' ex-
posures and internal controls are monitored on a regular basis, although there
are no specified limits. Elsewhere, as in, for example, Germany, Japan, and the
United Kingdom, guidelines or stronger constraints limit open positions to a
specified ratio to total capital. Banks' internal risk management controls in-
clude the separation of dealing operations—in which buy/sell orders are
taken—and back-office activities where contracts are confirmed and settled,
the imposition of position limits on the dealing book, and limits on the exten-
sion of credit to individual counterparties.
The dominance of the major dealing banks in the markets for foreign ex-
12. This strategy is referred to by Leland, O'Brien and Rubinstein and Associates as a perpetual
protection policy.
13. A constant-percentage portfolio insurance strategy has an advantage over an option replica-
tion strategy in that at the end of the period a renewal of the hedge does not require a large trading
operation. For an option replication strategy, at expiration the portfolio is either 100 percent
hedged or completely unhedged. Renewal of the strategy for another period then requires a large
jump in the hedge ratio.
14. For a discussion on the regulatory and internal constraints on banks' foreign exchange trad-
ing, see Goldstein et al. (1993).218 Peter M. Garber and Michael G. Spencer
change options complicates the control of foreign exchange risk and makes
banks major users of dynamic hedging techniques. In its study of foreign ex-
change market transactions in April 1992, the Bank for International Settle-
ments (1993) found that only 10 percent of options trading was conducted on
organized exchanges. Moreover, two-thirds of the banks' options transactions,
measured by notional principal, had other banks or dealers as counterparties
and only one-third involved a nonbank counterparty.
The high ratio of interdealer to customer business can be attributed in part
to the dealers' hedging operations. A bank that writes an option becomes ex-
posed to the possibility that the option will be exercised, and it will have to
buy or sell foreign currency (depending on whether it has written a put or a
call). The simplest hedge in this case would be to acquire a perfectly offsetting
contract. For a bank that maintains a large options book, many of its options
contracts will indeed offset each other. Because OTC options are by nature
nonstandard, however, a bank must have a method to break down each option
in its book into its implied foreign exchange position. It can then determine its
global net position in each currency by adding its net position from trading in
other foreign exchange products to its net position implied in its options book.
The foreign exchange equivalent into which a bank will decompose its op-
tions will depend on the currency options pricing formula used by the bank,
but it will usually be based on delta hedging methods. The bank calculates the
delta for all the contracts it has written or bought and multiplies these by the
face values of the contracts. These are then added up for each currency to
estimate the expected net foreign currency delivery requirement. For
European-style options, in which exercise is possible only at maturity, the
hedge portfolio will include futures or forward contracts that offset these
amounts, while, for American-style options, the hedge will include cash posi-
tions. Because the management of the foreign exchange book is global, the
amounts required to hedge the options will be netted against spot and forward
net positions.
For example, suppose that the global position in the currency option book
of a bank making a market in derivatives is short one OTC European deutsche
mark put option that allows the holder to sell DM 1.00 for $X at time T and
long one European put option to sell DM 1.00 for French francs at T*. If the
bank uses the Garman/Kohlhagen formula, its deutsche mark position from its
options book is
Option DM Position
1. Short 1 putDM/$ [1 - N(<i,)]exp[-rDMr]
2. Long 1 put DM/Fr -[1 - N(d^)]e\p[-rDMT']
In these formulas, dx and d* are defined as above with the appropriate volatili-
ties and exercise prices substituted for each option. If the bank is also long219 Dynamic Hedging
deutsche mark in its forward and spot trading, it can determine its global for-
eign exchange exposure in deutsche mark by adding these three quantities. The
bank can then hedge the foreign exchange risk by taking the opposite position
in the forward market. Because the implied delivery dates across its deutsche
mark contracts may differ, this still leaves the bank with an interest rate risk
that can be hedged through appropriate deutsche mark forwards or swaps.
6.3 Hedging in a Crisis
Dynamic hedging strategies are not an entirely new activity—stop-loss trad-
ing had always been triggered by price movements beyond a certain threshold.
Dynamic hedging simply mechanizes this response. To the extent, however,
that the technique has been adopted by large segments of the financial interme-
diation industry and has been implemented more rapidly than previous tech-
niques, dynamic hedging strategies have added to trading volume and have
accentuated price movements by contributing to momentary illiquidity. In this
section, we consider how the widespread use of dynamic hedging tech-
niques—notably, those involved in option replication—may interact with cen-
tral bank exchange rate and liquidity policies to undermine a defense of a fixed
exchange rate system.
When a fixed exchange rate regime moves toward a crisis, speculation
against the currency is generally channeled through forward sales of the cur-
rency to the banking system. Some margin is required by counterparty banks,
but this can be leveraged up by a factor of ten or more by the speculator. In a
crisis, these sales will generally not be matched by other customers' forward
purchases of the currency. The central bank defending the currency may inter-
vene with forward purchases, but the extent of such an operation is limited by
the unwillingness of a central bank to risk large capital losses on negative net
foreign exchange positions and by limits on credit lines to the central bank
made available by the major dealing banks.
1
5 Once the central bank ceases to
buy its currency in the forward market, banks must balance their forward pur-
chases with spot sales of the currency (to balance the net currency position)
and by currency swaps (to balance maturities).
Likewise, during a crisis, the central bank will be the most important buyer
on the spot market through its intervention to maintain the fixed exchange rate.
At the same time, it provides its currency through the discount window to the
banks who need to sell currency in order to match their forward and spot for-
eign exchange positions as discussed in the previous paragraph. By providing
liquidity to banks through this kind of facility, the central bank is effectively
financing the attack on its own reserves. To settle its spot transactions, the
central bank must deliver its own foreign exchange reserves or draw down lines
15. The ability of the central bank to enter forward contracts with its own nationally chartered
banks is circumscribed by credit line limits imposed by banks elsewhere on these banks.220 Peter M. Garber and Michael G. Spencer
of credit from other central banks or multilateral entities. As its short foreign
exchange position mounts during the intervention, the central bank must act
by raising the discount rate. This increases the cost to speculators who specu-
late against the currency by borrowing from the central bank. The central bank
also imposes a squeeze on short sellers by channeling available credit away
from identified speculators.
This final operation is the classic interest rate defense of a fixed exchange
rate. It works though a liquidity effect in the money market—domestic credit
grows less rapidly than central bank net reserves decline, thereby producing a
decline in the supply of the domestic settlement medium. If large short posi-
tions in the currency are due for settlement, holders of short positions may sell
foreign exchange to the central bank rather than face the high interest costs of
rolling over overnight loans in the weak currency. The costs to holders of short
positions are further accentuated if in addition they are caught in a squeeze so
that they have to pay more than the discount rate to obtain funds.
The market's acquisition of foreign exchange from the central bank does not
arise exclusively from forward sales by nonbank speculators. Speculators and
hedgers may also buy put options on the weak currency from the banks. Again,
in a crisis, the banking system will likely be unable to find nonbank sellers of
puts to balance these position.
1
6 To hedge, the bank that writes the put may
create a long position in a synthetic put by selling the weak currency forward,
by selling on the futures market, or by selling spot and entering a swap con-
tract. Any of these operations will trigger a spot sale of the weak currency to
the central bank as described above.
6.3.1 The Effect of Interest Rate Changes on Dynamic Hedging
Once a central bank raises interest rates in defense of the fixed exchange
rate, hedging operations may trigger further sales of the currency rather than
the purchases anticipated from the squeeze. This result follows from the




16. Even if a nonbank seller of puts exists somewhere in the financial system, the selling bank
seeking cover may not find the nonbank seller of puts through the banking system. In a crisis,
gross volumes of trading surge, thereby causing many banks to reach their credit ceilings with
other banks. As the banking system becomes illiquid in this way, transactions that passed through
the banking system on a credit basis now must seek a cash market. To hedge, the selling bank will
place an order to buy a put onto the organized currency options market, where credit risk is not
an issue, and will find the potential seller in this market. As the crisis progresses and interbank
credit lines fill, volume will tend to move to the more secure organized exchanges.
17. As Bill Branson has reminded us, differentiating delta with respect to rDM yields an expres-
sion that is not easily signed. In numerical evaluations, delta is a downward-sloping convex func-
tion of rDM for most parameter values. However, for options with long maturities or very low
implied volatilities or that are deep in the money, the relation may turn positive, although relatively
flat, after sufficiently large increases in the foreign interest rate. For example, for the parameters
used in fig. 6.1 below, if the contract maturity was six months, the slope would turn positive after
rDM exceeds 39 percent. For very long options (e.g., one year) with very low volatilities, delta may
be everywhere increasing in the foreign interest rate.221 Dynamic Hedging
Intuitively, the interest rate differential between the two currencies reflects
the expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate plus a risk premium.
Unless volatility increases or attitudes toward risk change, a rise in the differ-
ential between deutsche mark and dollar interest rates means that the deutsche
mark is expected to depreciate more rapidly against the dollar—that is, the
delta or hedge ratio increases.
1
8
With an unchanged current exchange rate, exercise price, and exchange rate
volatility, the put option is much more likely to finish in the money when the
interest rate jumps upward. That the option is more likely to be exercised
means that it provides a higher effective hedge to a portfolio manager covering
a deutsche mark portfolio. The manager of the bank's portfolio who uses a
synthetic put in a dynamic hedging operation must likewise provide an in-
creased hedge ratio in response to the greater probability that the option will
be exercised. This means that he must short sell more deutsche mark so that
his synthetic put continues to mimic an actual put. Taken to an extreme, if
deutsche mark interest rates rise so high that, according to the underlying the-
ory, it is almost certain that a put option will be exercised, the put then provides
the equivalent of a 100 percent hedge ratio. The bank's portfolio manager using
a synthetic put must similarly sell sufficient deutsche mark to cover his entire
deutsche mark position to provide the same coverage as an actual put.
How important will the dynamic hedging response be? Figure 6.1 provides
some indication of this effect. This figure plots the put option delta against the
foreign interest rate for a one-month, at-the-money put and for an in-the-
money put of equal maturity where the spot exchange rate is assumed to be 1
percent below the strike price. Delta is a declining, convex function of the
Such anomalies are likely to be unimportant for three reasons. First, Bank for International
Settlements (1993) data on the maturity structure of forward contracts show that foreign exchange
dealers' positions are strongly weighted toward the near term: 64 percent of contracts have maturi-
ties of less than a week, 99 percent are for less than a year, and ERM currencies have relatively
short maturities compared to non-ERM currencies. In addition, futures and exchange-traded op-
tions transactions tend to be concentrated in contracts with maturities well below one year. Thus,
the behavior of long-term options may not be very relevant. Second, central bank liquidity
squeezes generally have their greatest effect on short-term interest rates, so increases in long-term
rates are unlikely to be large enough to reverse the tendency toward an increase in the hedge ratio.
In the United Kingdom, on 16 September 1994 six-month sterling deposit rates rose only twenty
basis points, while one-week rates rose by thirty-five hundred basis points; during the ERM crises,
six-month interest rate differentials against dollar LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) rates
were highest for Sweden, and these reached only 23 percent. Finally, simulations using actual
interest rates and historical volatilities for the currencies involved in the ERM crisis failed to yield
any cases where the slope reversed over the range of observed interest rates. Since actual volatili-
ties used in pricing options during a crisis can be expected to exceed historical volatilities, it is
likely that the slope of the delta: rDM relation was if anything more negative than that implied by
either these simulations or fig. 6.1.
18. A central bank squeeze generally operates through overnight interest rates, which are not
the interest rates used to value longer-dated options. Nevertheless, in a squeeze, a jump in over-
night rates will usually have a strong effect on one-month, three-month, and even one-year interest
rates, which are relevant to option pricing. As the maturity of the option lengthens, a given move-
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Fig. 6.1 Sensitivity of the put option delta to the foreign interest rate
Note: Assumptions: domestic rate of 3 percent, volatility of 15 percent, one-month option.
foreign interest rate. The response of dynamic hedging programs during the
final days of a managed or fixed exchange rate regime can be inferred from
such plots. In the days leading up to the collapse of an exchange rate band
regime, the gradual depreciation in the spot exchange rate will have a signifi-
cant effect on the hedge ratio, necessitating a gradual increase in the short
foreign currency position. However, in the final hours or minutes of such a
regime or of an absolutely fixed exchange rate, the use of large interest rate
increases to defend the fixed exchange rate can result in increases in the hedge
ratio of a similar magnitude.
In the United Kingdom, for example, on 16 September 1992 the Bank of
England increased the base lending rate twice, from 10 percent to 12 percent
and then again to 15 percent (effective the next day).
1
9 The one-month London
interbank offer rate increased from 10.4 percent at the end of the previous day
to 28.9 percent at the end of the sixteenth. Such an interest rate increase would
result in a decrease in the delta (or an increase in the hedge ratio) of an at-the-
money put of over 20 percent, from -0.54 to -0.66—a larger change than
would have been obtained from a 1 percent depreciation at the initial interest
rate. In the Swedish market, the increase in the marginal lending rate from 75
percent to 500 percent on 16 September led to an increase in the one-month
19. For descriptions of the European currency crisis of 1992-93, see Goldstein et al. (1993) and
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STIBOR (Stockholm interbank offered rate) rate from 25 to 70 percent. An
increase in rates of this magnitude would imply a 30 percent increase in the
hedge ratio. For countries such as France and Italy where one-month interest
rates were not as variable, the largest increases in delta that would be implied
by the interest rate data are of an order of magnitude of 10 percent.
In an exchange crisis, therefore, a large defensive rise in the interest rate
aimed at imposing a squeeze on speculators will instantaneously trigger hedg-
ing programs to order sales of the weak currency.
2
0 The experiment conducted
using the contracts illustrated in figure 6.1 suggests that the selling triggered
by dynamic hedging programs during an interest rate defense can be signifi-
cant. Since delta approximates the proportion of the portfolio to be hedged by
short positions in the foreign currency, these examples suggest that short posi-
tions might be increased by 20 percent or more of the portfolio value in re-
sponse to an aggressive interest rate increase. The existence of a large amount
of such programs in the market would undermine the use of an interest rate
defense of a weak currency—the moment that a central bank raises interest
rates, it might face an avalanche of sales of its currency rather than the pur-
chases of the squeezed shorts that it had anticipated.
2
1 In effect, the hedging
programs make the hedgers insensitive to the added costs of funding their weak
currency sales.
20. Who is actually squeezed in such a defense? All borrowers in the weak currency whose
debts are due for settlement or rollover soon (after two days) will find that their costs and risks
have suddenly jumped as they now have to pay high and volatile yields to the money market
scalpers that are unleashed by the squeeze.
This group could conceivably include even those who have constructed synthetic puts if they
have established their short currency position by borrowing on overnight rollover credit, as Richard
Lyons has pointed out to us in his conference comments. Typically, however, a synthetic option is
constructed by establishing a short forward position whose expiration date coincides with the
expiration date of the option. If the existing hedges were constructed well before the interest rate
defense was launched and with a relatively long maturity, they would have locked in longer-term
finance, and the position would be immune from a short squeeze.
21. Industry sources indicate that, indeed, when there is an increase in the interest rate spread
with no movement in the exchange rate, the forward rate discount will trigger a selloff in the
currency through dynamic hedging. During the European exchange rate mechanism crisis of Sep-
tember 1992, e.g., industry sources estimate that dynamic hedging sales to adjust positions because
of increases in interest rate spreads, exchange rate movements, and increases in volatility ac-
counted for 20-30 percent of the selling in the crisis. It was a major factor in the lira market one
week after the first devaluation and also in the Swedish krona market in 1992. Up to 10 percent
of the sales were due to increases in interest rate spreads. In the case of the United Kingdom, on
16 September 1992 the dramatic increase in forward discounts triggered sales of pounds. When
interest rates rose and nothing happened to the exchange rates, the selling programs were turned
on. The lack of movement (appreciation) in the exchange rate meant that the forward rate fell
farther below the floor. Thus, the full force of programmed sales triggered by interest rate move-
ments was not offset by exchange rate improvement. Another source of the sales volumes at this
moment was the rising perceived volatility resulting from the suddenly larger movement of the
forward rate below the floor. The effect of dynamic hedging sales may also have been a source of
some of the selling pressure observed on 12 August 1994, when the Italian lira depreciated sharply
after the Banca DTtalia raised the discount rate by fifty basis points, although the consensus view
is that markets reacted to a belief that the interest rate increases were fiscally unsustainable.224 Peter M. Garber and Michael G. Spencer
If the central bank has a credit line limit in foreign exchange or a self-
imposed net reserve position limit, the upsurge of selling brought about by the
interest rate increase might cause a sudden jump to its limit and force it to
cease intervention in defense of the exchange rate. Whether this counterintu-
itive result occurs depends on the weight of these mechanistic traders relative
to those caught in the short squeeze.
In one scenario, the hedging operation may in any case far exceed the
amount of the weak currency demanded by those caught in the squeeze. In this
case, the timing of the hedging sales—the prearranged rule for awakening the
selling programs—relative to the time at which those caught in the short
squeeze appear on the market is immaterial to the survival of the fixed ex-
change rate. Dominance by the mechanistic hedges will defeat the interest
rate defense.
In the scenario in which the amounts of these opposite transactions are
roughly balanced or even where those caught in the short squeeze dominate,
the timing of transactions is key. If the selling programs switch on instantly
but the buying operations to cover short positions occur with some lag, the
central banks' net short foreign exchange limit may be exceeded prior to the
appearance of the buyers of its currency, causing the abandonment of the fixed
exchange rate. Buyers might have appeared by the end of the day to offset the
sellers, but the initial selling may unnerve the central bank and force devalua-
tion. The devaluation will ratify the actions both of the sellers and of those
caught in the squeeze who hesitated. Sellers will have sold prior to the devalua-
tion of the exchange rate, and those caught in the squeeze can buy back into
the weak currency at a lower price. If the central bank simultaneously relaxes
the high interest rates, overnight borrowing will cease to be a problem for those
caught short, and the squeeze will be suspended.
6.4 Conclusion
In their effect on the viability of the interest rate defense of a fixed exchange
rate, dynamic hedging programs can be interpreted as a new wrinkle on an
old phenomenon. Skeptical participants in the foreign exchange market have
sometimes interpreted a defensive increase in the interest rate as the last rear-
guard action preparatory to the abandonment of a fixed rate. In this light, the
suddenly higher interest rate differential signals only the extent of the im-
pending depreciation of the exchange rate and certainly not a drastic and ex-
tended tightening of liquidity in the weak currency's money markets. Interpre-
ting the interest rate increase in this way dictates that a speculative selling
program should be begun. Dynamic hedging programs automatically place this
interpretation on an interest rate increase; thus, they are a mechanization of
the previously informal skepticism that occasionally arose about exchange rate
defenses. To the extent that such programs are present in generating large sell-
ing volumes, they signal a major shift toward skepticism about the strength of225 Dynamic Hedging
the central bank's adherence to the policy of defending the exchange rate,
thereby undermining the efficacy of a previously useful defensive tool.
The scenario that we depict here is a technical story about the character of
minute-by-minute trading in the death throes of a fixed exchange rate. A dra-
matic interest rate increase in a last ditch defense triggers dramatic selling
pressure. If this technical feature of the market is important in the last moments
of a fixed exchange rate, it is necessary to implement a defense operation that
takes it into account. For example, it is often argued that a resolute defense of
a fixed exchange rate regime requires that at an early date interest rates be
raised gradually, although ultimately to high levels.
2
2 Such a policy would trig-
ger daily selling of the currency by dynamic hedgers, but not in quantities that
would overwhelm the central bank's net reserve limits before the appearance
as buyers by the end of the day of those caught short in the currency. Thus,
raising rates gradually in an interest rate defense may immunize the central
bank against being pushed intraday beyond its position limits.
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Comment Richard K. Lyons
This comment is intended to clarify assumptions embedded in the option hedg-
ing analysis of the Garber and Spencer paper. In particular, the authors state
(in section 6.3.1) that "a large defensive rise in the interest rate aimed at impos-
ing a squeeze on speculators will instantaneously trigger hedging programs to
order sales of the weak currency."
Here, I demonstrate that this result is not unambiguous; rather, additional
assumptions are required regarding the interest sensitivity of the underlying
Richard K. Lyons is associate professor in the Haas School of Business at the University of
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portfolio's value relative to the hedge's value. To do so, I present a transparent
example using a money market hedge, which is a special case of their option
foreign exchange hedge.
1 The analysis of Garber and Spencer spans this case
since—assuming frictionless markets—a money market hedge is equivalent
to a forward hedge, which is in turn equivalent to a put option hedge with a
strike price of infinity.
Assumptions
1. Two-period investment horizon.
2. Equal borrowing and lending (investment) rates for the same maturity.
3. Foreign exchange hedge ratio is constant.
Notation
R™ = one-period nominal deutsche mark interest rate.
/?°
M = two-period nominal deutsche mark interest rate.
The Four Cases
Case 1: (i) Investment: R%
M
(ii) Hedge borrowing: /?°
M
(iii) T R®
M => no change in deutsche mark borrowing for hedge =>
no spot sale of deutsche mark
Case 2: (i) Investment: R™
(ii) Hedge borrowing: Rf
M
(iii) T /?f
M => no change in deutsche mark borrowing for hedge =>
no spot sale of deutsche mark
Case 3: (i) Investment: R™
(ii) Hedge borrowing: i?f
M
(iii) T R°
M => I in deutsche mark borrowing for hedge => spot
purchase of deutsche mark
Case 4: (i) Investment: R™
(ii) Hedge borrowing: R™
(iii) T R™ => T in deutsche mark borrowing for hedge => spot sale
of deutsche mark
From these four cases it is clear that the Garber-Spencer effect on the spot
market holds only in case 4. This may well be the relevant case for most
investors, but that is an empirical matter. Note that if investors are using
rolling hedges, as many do, then cases 2 and 3 might be more relevant.
(Rolling hedges involve the rolling over of the hedge position because the
hedging instrument has a shorter maturity than the cash flow being hedged.)
1. A money market hedge involves either borrowing or lending in the foreign currency to set up
an offsetting foreign currency cash flow. Importantly, putting on (or changing) a money market
hedge will also involve a transaction in today's spot market.